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After Whaling in the Antarctic: Amending Article VIII to Fix a Broken 
Treaty Regime 
 
Anastasia Telesetsky and Seokwoo Lee* 
 
Abstract: Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) has been at the center of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling 
industry States and whale preservationist States that threatens to collapse the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) as a treaty regime. This article describes 
the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court of Justice  
Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the ICJ’s decision highlights further 
weaknesses in the existing ICRW treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty regime have 
become even more apparent with the IWC Scientific Committee’s request for more data from 
the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research 
Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) and Japan’s diplomatic threat to unilaterally 
resume whaling. The paper concludes with a suggestion that States amend Article VIII in 
order to strengthen the existing ICRW framework.          
Keywords: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, International Whaling 
Commission, Whaling in the Antarctic, IWC Scientific Committee, ICRW Article VII 
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In the shadow of the March 31, 2014 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on Whaling 
in the Antarctic,1 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) created by the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) to adopt regulations “with respect to the 
conservation and utilization of whale resources” faces yet another trying period.2 While this 
is not the first crisis of institutional legitimacy faced by the IWC, it raises deeper questions 
about the sustainability of the IWC as the international body that is not only responsible for 
imposing a commercial whaling moratorium but that is also required to “provide for the 
conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources.”3 When the ICJ 
decided that the design and implementation of Japan’s Antarctic Research Program whaling 
program (JARPA II) was not “reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s stated 
research objective”, the ICJ ended up assuming a gatekeeper role that should have been 
internally managed within the ICRW regime.4 Part One examines recurring fissures in the 
ICRW regime between States who wish to resume commercial whaling and States who are 
committed to a moratorium. Part Two explains how the recent ICJ case and subsequent 
responses to the case by the IWC members highlight the ongoing rifts with the ICRW regime. 
Part Three offers brief comments on how Article VIII of the ICRW may need to be amended 
or risk institutional implosion. 
 
Early Fissures in the ICRW Treaty Regime 
In the 1930s and 1940s, it became clear to many States that whale populations had been 
severely overharvested to be processed into oil, soaps and other household products like 
margarine as well as being consumed as meat.5 Yet, the genesis of the ICRW regime as a 
                                           
*Anastasia Telesetsky is Associate Professor of International Law, University of Idaho College of Law, USA; 
Seokwoo Lee is Professor of Law at Inha University Law School, Incheon, Korea 
 
 
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) (31 March 2014). Judgment, 
Declarations, Separate Opinions, and Dissenting Opinions available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015 [hereinafter ‘Whaling in the Antarctic’]. 
2 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, Article V(1) 
[hereinafter ‘ICRW’]. 
3 Ibid., at Article V(2).  
4 Judgment (n.1) at p. 65, para. 227. 
5 J. Hannewijk, ‘Use of Fish Oils in Margarine and Shortening’ in M.E. Stansby (ed.), Fish Oils (Avi Publishing 
Company, Westport, 1967) 251-269, at p. 251. (“In Europe, Canada, Japan, and other countries hardened whale 
oil has been used in margarine and edible fats for over 50 years.”); P.J. Clapham and C.S. Baker, ‘Whaling, 
 
 3  
management treaty was a struggle. Key states opted out of early versions of regulatory 
whaling regimes designed to restrain overharvesting. Even though Japan and the USSR were 
among the most active of the commercial whaling nations, neither Japan nor the USSR 
ratified the first Convention for the Regulation of Whaling negotiated in 1931 to protect right 
whales or the Second Convention for the Regulation of Whaling negotiated in 1937 to protect 
gray whales.6 
As whale stocks continued to decline, States eventually reached a cooperative agreement in 
1946 under the ICRW with membership from active whaling nations including Japan and the 
USSR. Yet the treaty regime lacked cooperative enforcement measures. Almost immediately 
after the treaty entered into force, States failed to comply with quotas set by the IWC and in 
some instances actively falsified their capture numbers.7 Patience with the incapacity of the 
ICRW regime to respond effectively to global overharvesting was fraying. In 1972 at the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, the US requested a 
moratorium on all endangered whale species in part because of the perceived mismanagement 
of whales under the ICRW regime; the request received 53 supporting votes and 12 
abstentions.8 Subsequently, a number of whaling industry States, arguing that there was a 
lack of scientific evidence to support a moratorium, blocked a vote in 1974 for the IWC to 
impose a moratorium.9 For a number of the ICRW’s members such as the US who were 
                                                                                                                                   
Modern’ in W.F. Perrin, B. Wursig, and J. Thewissen (eds.), Encyclopedia of Marine Mammals (Academic Press, 
New York, 2002) 1328-1332, (Noting that even by World War I many whalers had commercially exhausted their 
original target species and were seeking new species in new hunting grounds.) 
6 L. Kobayashi, ‘Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Commercial Whaling as the 
Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling’ (2006) 29(2) Environs: Environmental Law & Policy Journal 
177-219, at pp. 180-7.  
7 P. Clapham, et al. “Catches of Humpback Whales, Megaptera Novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and other 
Nations in the Southern Ocean, 1947-1973” (2009) 71(1) Marine Fisheries Review, 39-43 at p. 40 (Describing 
how the Soviet Union in its Southern Hemisphere reports to the IWC claimed to take 2,710 humpback whales 
but actually took 48,477 humpback whales.)  
8 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 
1972, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 at p. 12, Recommendation 33 (“It is recommended that Governments agree to 
strengthen the International Whaling Commission, to increase international research efforts, and as a matter of 
urgency to call for an international agreement, under the auspices of the International Whaling Commission and 
involving all Governments concerned, for a l0-year moratorium on commercial whaling.”); Ibid., at p. 56, paras. 
191-192. (Relabeling recommendation 33 as recommendation 86 for purposes of voting at the UN Convention 
on the Environment and Development. In response to the vote, Japan “explained that while it was favourable to 
a moratorium on commercial whaling, it had abstained in the vote because the whole question was to be 
considered by the International Whaling Commission on the basis of available scientific information.”)  
9 International Commission on Whaling, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commission, Appendix III, 
“International Whaling Commission Chairman’s Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, Summary of Main 
Decisions Made at Meeting” (1974) 20-36 at pp. 24-25 (Observing that a global moratorium was opposed by 
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frustrated with the politics of the IWC, the IWC was regarded as an institution captured by 
minority interests until 1982 when a 10-year moratorium was adopted for all commercial 
whaling until additional studies could be undertaken to determine what level of commercial 
whaling might be sustainably revived. The moratorium vote reflected a new pattern of rift 
lines.10 The IWC that had been designed as an institution to protect the long-term interests of 
whaling industry through the conservation of whale populations for harvest had gradually 
became “preservationist.”11 After the moratorium, the protection of certain whale species and 
the creation of whale sanctuaries under the ICRW were both deemed necessary by the 
majority of IWC parties to achieve global preservation objectives rather than resource 
management measures. With a prohibition on all commercial whaling in the Indian Ocean 
Sanctuary and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, whaling industry States are now at constant 
odds with whale preservation States. Industry states such as Norway have largely defected 
from the regime by objecting to the moratorium and unilaterally deciding appropriate catch 
quotas on the basis of interpreting data from IWC’s Scientific Committee.12 Since 1990, the 
Japanese government has regularly requested for the moratorium to be lifted for whale stocks 
such as minke whales that are no longer threatened or endangered.13 Given the limited global 
                                                                                                                                   
IWC’s Technical Committee and Scientific Committee with the justification that stocks should be managed 
individually. Stating that the vote in the IWC plenary for a global moratorium was four delegations in favor, six 
delegations opposed, and four delegations abstaining); ICRW (n.1.) at Article III(2) (Votes to change the ICRW 
Schedule on whaling catch limits require a three-quarter majority.) 
10 The moratorium was decided by a 25 to 7 vote with 5 abstentions. Voting for the moratorium were Antigua, 
Australia, Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Oman, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, the Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Voting against the moratorium were Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Peru, South Korea, and the USSR. 
Abstaining from the vote were Chile, China, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. International 
Whaling Commission, ‘Chairman’s Report of the 34th Annual Meeting’ (1983) 33 Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 20-42, at p. 21. See generally P. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling (Oceana 
Publications, 1985). 
11 H.M. Babcock, ‘Why Changing Norms is a More Just Solution to the Failed International Regulatory Regime 
to Protect Whales than a Trading Program in Whale Shares’ (2013) 32(3) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 
3-83, at p. 14. 
12 The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Norwegian Whaling-Based on a Balanced 
Ecosystem (March 19, 2013). Available at http://www.fisheries.no/ecosystems-and-
stocks/marine_stocks/mammals/whales/whaling/#.Vb_kGN597dk; accessed 1 August 2015. (Observing that 
“Even though the work of the [International Whaling] Commission has not been constructive, the work in the 
IWC’s Scientific Committee has been of considerable importance in respect of the resumption of Norwegian 
whaling operations.”) 
13 R. Smith, Japan's International Fisheries Policy: Law, Diplomacy and Politics Governing Resource Security 
(Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2014) 140; For a detailed explanation of the Japanese choice not to 
oppose the commercial moratorium, please refer to A. Ishii and A. Okubo, ‘An Alternative Explanation of 
Japan’s Whaling Diplomacy in the Post-Moratorium Era’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Wildlife Law and 
Policy 55-87, at pp. 58-61. 
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market for whaling products and the strong public sentiment against commercial whaling, 
there has been little inclination for the majority of the IWC States to resume discussions on 
commercial whaling management. 
The divisions in the treaty regime have become particularly pronounced in the debates within 
the Scientific Committee to develop a Revised Management Scheme (RMS) to implement a 
1994 Revised Management Procedure (RMP) to set future quotas for whale harvests. With 
respect to the RMS, whaling States argue that the existing practices within the IWC are 
sufficient to ensure that the RMP quotas will be respected.14 Whale preservation States argue 
for the need to have independent monitoring and inspection of whaling activities. 15 
Increasingly, the gaps have been widening between States that are willing to trust the existing 
institution of the IWC to protect sovereign interests and States that seek institutional reform. 
Relations between whaling industry States and preservationist States became increasingly 
fractious when whale preservation nations repeatedly singled out Japan’s scientific whaling 
program as problematic. In 2003, the IWC majority passed a recommendation for Japan’s 
scientific whaling program JARPA to end unless it ceased using lethal methods for scientific 
research. The Scientific Committee was expected to review the existing JARPA programs and 
provide advice about the output of these efforts. In 2005, the IWC majority again passed a 
resolution to request Japan to “withdraw” its JARPA II proposal or revise it to eliminate the 
lethal take components. Finally, in 2007, the IWC majority called upon Japan to “suspend 
indefinitely the lethal aspects of JARPA II in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary.”16 All of 
this was to no avail as the Japanese government continued to justify its scientific whaling 
fleet efforts as essential for understanding how to set appropriate RMPs in order to eventually 
revive a sustainable commercial whale harvest. 
The IWC itself has recognized that it faces core institutional legitimacy questions. In 2008, 
the IWC established a working group on “The Future of the IWC” to examine institutional 
reforms including the issuance of research permits under Article VIII of the ICRW. By 2010, 
                                           
14 Clapham and Baker (n. 5). 
15 IWC, ‘Revised Management Scheme: Information on the Background and Progress of the Revised 
Management Scheme (RMS).’ Available at https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=rmp; accessed 18 March 2015. 
16 IWC, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2003, 55th Annual Meeting, 2003, Resolution 
2003-2, Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit’; IWC, ‘Resolution 2005-1, Resolution on JARPA II’; 
IWC, ‘Resolution 2007-1, Resolution on JARPA.’ Available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/themes.php; accessed 18 March 2015. 
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all that the group was able to agree to regarding scientific permits was that “Proposals will be 
developed to address these issues for consideration during the initial five years of the 
arrangement.”17 Ultimately, the working group failed to agree to any reforms for the future. 
Instead, the IWC appears to be trapped in an institutional limbo unable to assert itself as the 
international authoritative body to “ensure proper and effective conservation and 
development of whale stocks.”18 
 
Whaling in the Antarctic: Further Fracturing of the ICRW Treaty Regime 
While the IWC struggled to reform itself and improve its institutional legitimacy, Australia 
filed an application before the ICJ alleging that Japan was in violation of its ICRW 
obligations under Article VIII to conduct a program “for purposes of scientific research”, 
paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule to observe in good faith the zero catch limit for commercial 
whaling, and paragraph 7(b) of the Schedule to act in good faith to refrain from undertaking 
commercial whaling of humpback and fin whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.19 
Australia filed its application as a signal of its frustration with the failure of bilateral 
diplomacy to resolve the dispute and the inadequacy of the IWC to respond appropriately to 
what Australia claimed to be treaty violations.20   
The ICJ case is interesting because it involves interpretation not of the core principles of the 
ICRW but rather the secondary obligations of the treaty regarding scientific permits. Japan’s 
decision not to oppose the commercial whaling moratorium in 1982 is the origin of the ICJ 
conflict. After the moratorium was adopted as an amendment to the Schedule, States under 
Article V(3) of the ICRW had the option to object within 90 days to the moratorium; any 
objection would prevent the moratorium from going into effect for an additional 90 days for 
all States.. For those States that had not originally objected to the moratorium but chose to 
submit an objection during the second 90 day period, the moratorium would not become 
                                           
17 IWC, ‘Chair’s Report to the Small Working Group on the Future of IWC’, IWC/M10/SWG 4. Available at 
https://iwc.int/private/downloads/2kakj06ab44k88sk4c84wwkok/iwc-m10-swg4.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015. 
18 ICRW (n. 2). 
19 Application Instituting Proceedings, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), 
2010 I.C.J. 148, at paras. 36-37 (31 May 2010) Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf; 
accessed 18 March 2015.  
20 Australia appointed a Special Envoy on Whale Conservation to work with the Japanese government on 
addressing Australia’s concerns about the Article VIII process in Japan. Ibid., at para. 33. 
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effective. The U.S. threatened, however to apply the Pelly Amendment against States that 
intended to object to the moratorium. If the Secretary of Commerce took action under the 
Pelly Amendment, this might have prevented products from States such as Norway, Japan, 
and Iceland from being imported into the US.21 While Norway objected to the moratorium 
and announced that it would be resuming commercial whaling in 1993,22 Japan never entered 
an objection to the moratorium because of concerns over U.S. fisheries sanctions on Japanese 
exports.23 Japan had the opportunity like Norway and Iceland to exercise its sovereign rights 
to refuse the moratorium under Article V(3) of the ICRW but instead sought to assert its 
sovereign interests in a lateral fashion under Article VIII.   
Starting in 1987, Japan decided to operate a whaling fleet affiliated with The Institute for 
Cetacean Research using Article VIII scientific research exception permits obtained from the 
Japanese Government. Article VIII of the ICRW provided that: 
any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special 
permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for 
purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number 
and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government 
thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of 
this Convention.24 
The original Article VIII language was negotiated at a time when it was not possible for 
States to conduct non-lethal scientific investigation in order to understand the life histories of 
whales. In the 1940s and 1950s with the introduction of the ICRW, the quality of global 
whale data was poor. The Article VIII language encouraged individual States to unilaterally 
collect research data for purposes of supporting their national whaling industry that could 
then be shared to assist the IWC in setting appropriate Maximum Sustainable Yield levels 
                                           
21 22 USC 1978 (“When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign country, directly or 
indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the 
effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify such fact 
to the President… the President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the bringing or the 
importation into the United States of any products from the offending country for any duration as the President 
determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by the World Trade Organization or 
the multilateral trade agreements.”) 
22 D. Caron, ‘The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The 
Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 154-
174, at p. 161. 
23 Smith (n. 13), at p. 139. 
24 ICRW (n. 2) (emphasis added). 
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that would support a viable global industry. The language was never intended to allow for 
unilateral commercial whaling by ICRW parties. 
After the 1982 moratorium, Japan initiated JARPA as its first large scientific whaling research 
program from 1987 until 2005. The research program was designed to understand what 
biological parameters impacted “stock management of the Southern Hemisphere minke 
whale” in order to understand the “stock structure”, what role whales played in the Antarctic 
ecosystem, and what effect environmental changes were having on the whales’ population.25 
A similar program was launched between 1994 and 1999 in the North Pacific to determine 
the feeding practices of minke whales as well as the “stock structures” of two groups of 
minke whales.26 While the JARPA II program which was created in 2005 was designed to 
continue research on the questions posed in JARPA,27 the JARPA II program was required to 
cease operations in 2014 in response to the ICJ’s decision in Whaling in the Antarctic. The 
Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the North Pacific, Phase II 
(JARPN II) program was not affected by the ICJ decision and continued with a focus on 
feeding ecology, bioaccumulation of pollutants in whales, and stock structure studies for the 
common minke whale, Bryde’s whale, sei whale, and sperm whales.28 Under all of its 
research programs, Japan sold meat for consumption from the whales that it caught and used 
the profits to support the Institute for Cetacean Research.29 Between its Antarctic and North 
Pacific programs, Japan has taken approximately 14,600 reported whales which is 7 times the 
number of whales taken by all other nations under Article VIII permits since 1952.30 
After Japan commenced JARPA II in 2005, many IWC countries, particularly Australia, the 
United States and New Zealand, filed repeated resolutions stating that JARPA II was either 
                                           
25 The Institute of Cetacean Research, ‘JARPA/JARPA II research results.’ Available at 
http://www.icrwhale.org/JARPAResults.html; accessed 18 March 2015. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Government of Japan, ‘Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special 
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) - Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New 
Management Objectives for Whale Resources.’ Available at http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC57O1.pdf; 
accessed 18 March 2015 [hereinafter ‘JARPA II Plan’]. 
28 Ibid., at p. 6. 
29 M. Park, ‘Japanese Scientific Whaling in Antarctica: Is Australia Attempting the Impossible?’ (2011) 9 New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 193-221, at p. 196; The Institute for Cetacean Research is a 
nonprofit research organization that is subsidized by the Japanese government. 
30 P.J. Clapham, ‘Japan’s Whaling Following the International Court of Justice Ruling: Brave New World - Or 
Business as Usual?’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy 238-241, at p. 239, fn. 2. 
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outside the scope of Article VIII or a bad faith use of the exception.31 In 2008, an Australian 
Federal Court ordered a Japanese whaling company to stop killing, injuring, or taking any 
Antarctic whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary, but the judgment was unenforceable 
because Australia’s maritime boundary claims in the Southern Ocean are contested.32 In 2010, 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warned Japan to end whaling or face legal action.33 In 
the 62nd meeting of the IWC, the Proposed Consensus Decision was presented which sought a 
compromise between Japan and States who questioned Japan’s use of the scientific exception 
by allowing Japan to harvest a small number of whales while ending the scientific purpose 
exception and bringing all whaling under the IWC's regulatory authority.34 The consensus 
was never adopted.35 
Australia questioned the increasing post-moratorium trends in Japanese whaling. If Japan was 
indeed pursuing the various research ends that it articulated in JARPA II, did Japan need to 
employ lethal methods to collect data on whaling stocks and marine ecosystems or was 
JARPA II essentially the equivalent of a commercial whaling program because it was not 
justified “for purposes of scientific research”? Could the pursuit of science explain why under 
JARPA II Japan assigned itself an annual quota of 850 minke whales, 50 humpback whales 
and 50 fin whales when Japan’s previous research efforts had only taken 840 whales in the 
Antarctic over the course of almost three decades?36 Was Japan hoodwinking all of the 
nations that had voted for the moratorium and exacerbating the institutional problems that 
already existed before the moratorium was approved? Or was Japan making a good faith 
effort to understand how to revive a commercial whaling industry in light of changed 
environmental conditions? The answers to these questions were politically charged.  
In light of the known and active fissures between pro-preservation and pro-whaling States 
                                           
31 IWC (n. 17). 
32 Humane Soc'y Int'l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (2008) FCR 3, para. 55 (Austl.). 
33 J. McCurry, ‘Australia Threatens Legal Action over Japanese Whaling’, The Guardian, 19 February 2010, at 
27. 
34 IWC, ‘Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales from the Chair and Vice-Chair 
of the Commission’, IWC/62/7rev (28 April 2010) Available at 
http://opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda_items/20100616/IWC%20Proposal%20(2).pdf; accessed 18 March 
2015. 
35 ‘Flexibility Needed on Whaling Issue,’ The Japan Times, 8 July 2010. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/07/08/editorials/flexibility-needed-on-whaling-
issue/#.UjPnUsbIZOw; accessed 18 March 2015. 
36 JARPA II Plan (n. 27), at pp. 18-19. 
 10  
and the inability to even reach a temporary consensus within the treaty bodies on how to 
move past the current impasse, the ICJ faced a difficult task. It could not wholesale end 
scientific whaling in spite of potential abuses such as conducting small-scale commercial 
whaling under the guise of scientific whaling permits. The ICJ, however, by rejecting JARPA 
II on the basis of several reasonableness factors assumed the role of a temporary proxy 
offering its decision-making in lieu of already fractured ICRW institutions. The ICJ judges 
were acutely aware of the fragile condition of the ICRW institutions at the time that they were 
deliberating. Judge Keith opened his declaration with a six paragraph description of the 
context of the case where he specifically pointed out that the membership of the ICRW has 
changed over the last 30 years leading to disagreements that have lead to the Commission 
becoming “deadlocked” and now meeting “only every second year.”37 
Beyond simply interpreting the meaning of the Article VIII disputed phrase “for the purposes 
of scientific research”, the ICJ chose to assume an active managerial role in the Whaling in 
the Antarctic case. Specifically, the ICJ indicated that it would “apply” its interpretation of 
Article VIII to “enquire into whether, based on the evidence, the design and implementation 
of JARPA II are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives.”38 The Court agreed 
with Japan that “JARPA II activities involving the lethal sampling of whales can broadly be 
characterized as ‘scientific research’.”39 
What happens next in the opinion is perhaps more surprising. The Court assigned itself the 
task to “examine whether the design and implementation of JARPA II are reasonable in 
relation to achieving the programme’s stated research objectives.”40 The Court does not 
conclude its decisions after it has interpreted Article VIII and then request for the IWC or the 
Scientific Committee, in particular, to determine whether the elements of JARPA II could be 
considered reasonable “for purposes of scientific research.” 
The ICJ seemed to mistrust on some level the objectiveness of the Scientific Committee’s 
work and was reluctant at least for the Whaling in the Antarctic case to yield decision-making 
                                           
37 Whaling in the Antarctic Declaration of Judge Keith (n.1) at para. 5, p. 2. Available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/18142.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015. 
38 Whaling in the Antarctic, Judgment (n.1) at para. 98, p. 35. 
39 Ibid., at para. 127, p. 41. 
40 Ibid., at para. 127, p. 42. 
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back to institutions that it might consider functionally problematic. When the Court described 
its review process as including steps to determine “whether, in the use of lethal methods the 
programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated 
objective”, the Court also emphasized “this standard of review is an objective one.”41 In 
describing the Scientific Committee’s work in connection to the JARPA II plan, the court 
tersely observed “Following review of the JARPA II Research Plan by the Scientific 
Committee, Japan granted the first set of annual special permit for JARPA II in November 
2005, after which JARPA II became operational.” It is a curious that there is no further 
commentary or reference at this point in the opinion to any of the content of the Scientific 
Committee’s review work on JARPA II in 2005. This purely descriptive sentence when read 
in light of the Court’s emphasis on underscoring its objective review might be interpreted to 
reflect an effort by the Court to indirectly comment on the current capacity of the Scientific 
Committee to conduct objective review. 
This reading is further reinforced when the Court does discuss the role of the Scientific 
Committee within the treaty regime. The ICJ understood the existing challenges of a 
fractured Scientific Committee and directly addressed these challenges in the portion of the 
opinion regarding whether Japan had complied with certain procedural aspects of providing 
permits under Article VIII. Australia alleged that Japan failed to provide the Scientific 
Committee with copies of the Article VIII permits prior to the commencement of JARPA II 
and that the permits that were provided did not contain necessary information. While the ICJ 
was persuaded that Japan had complied with these procedural components, the ICJ provided 
two additional comments hinting at discord within the Scientific Committee. First, they 
observed that the procedural requirements in the Schedule and Guidelines “must be 
appreciated in light of the duty of co-operation with the IWC and its Scientific Committee 
that is incumbent upon all States parties to the Convention.”42 Second, the ICJ suggested that 
cooperation may not be as forthcoming as desired since “63 Scientific Committee 
participants” of approximately 200 members “declined to take part in the 2005 review of the 
JARPA II Research Plan” but instead “submitted a separate set of comments on the JARPA II 
                                           
41 Ibid., at para. 67, p. 29.  
42 Ibid., at para. 240, p. 69. 
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Research Plan, which were critical of its stated objectives and methodology.”43 
Even though the majority of the ICJ did not remand the questions of review of JARPA II back 
to the ICRW institutions and decided instead to examine the design and implementation of 
JARPA II itself, at least one dissenter aptly suggests the majority may have taken on more 
than simply treaty interpretation. Judge Yusuf commented that it is not “the task of the ICJ to 
review and evaluate the design and implementation of a research plan for scientific whaling” 
because “[t]hat is the function of the Scientific Committee.”44 
Ultimately, the ICJ decided that JARPA II’s design and implementation was not reasonable in 
relation to the scientific program. Specifically regarding the design of JARPA II, the ICJ 
questioned whether Japan had given sufficient consideration to incorporating non-lethal 
methods of research when there had been substantial developments in non-lethal research 
techniques.45 In relation to the implementation of JARPA II, the ICJ expressed concern that 
the annual lethal sample sizes were not re-evaluated in light of the gap between the research 
plan’s proposed target sample size and the actual take.46 The ICJ ultimately concluded that 
JARPA II lacked sufficient evidence to support a nexus between its articulated research 
objectives and the numbers of whales that might be taken under the Japanese issued research 
permits.47 
While the ICJ appropriately did not weigh in on matters of scientific dispute, it did assume an 
active role in deciding questions regarding the “reasonableness” of JARPA II under the ICRW. 
Reflecting the current level of institutional dysfunction within the ICRW framework, the ICJ 
majority chose to assert its judicial authority as a temporary trucemaker between Japan as a 
pro-whaling State and Australia and New Zealand as pro-preservation States by making 
                                           
43 Ibid., at para. 241, p. 69. 
44 Whaling in the Antarctic, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf (n.1) at para. 4. p. 1; see also ibid., at para. 17, p. 
4 and at para. 61, p. 16 (“It is a pity that… the Court has engaged in an evaluation of the design and 
implementation of the programme [JARPA II] and their reasonableness in relation to its objectives, a task that 
normally falls within the competence of the Scientific Committee of the IWC ... As a matter of fact, when the 
Scientific Committee took the view in the past that a permit proposal submitted by a State did not meet its 
criteria, it specifically recommended that the permits sought should not be issued. This has not been the case 
with regard to JARPA II, but it shows at least that the Committee’s practice is adequate to the task of evaluating 
the design and implementation of scientific research programmes under the ICRW and accordingly advising the 
IWC on that matter.”) 
45 Whaling in the Antarctic, Judgment (n. 1) at para. 137, p. 43. 
46 Id., at para. 156, p. 48. 
47 Id., at paras. 195-198, pp. 57-58. 
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relatively specific decisions about the “reasonableness” of JARPA II as a scientific research 
program. On many levels, this should have been the work of the Scientific Committee 
working in close cooperation with the Commission. Judge Sebutinde, Judge Cancado 
Trindade, Judge Bhandari, and Judge ad hoc Charlesworth recognized in their separate 
opinions the need for the Committee to review and comment on special permits and for States 
to carefully consider the input of the Committee.48  
A number of the ICJ judges opined that the Scientific Committee needed to play a significant 
role in legitimizing the activities of the ICRW regime as part of a larger conversation between 
science and law. These Judges disagreed with the majority’s analysis of Paragraph 30 of the 
Schedule because the majority limited Paragraph 30 to a purely formal procedural 
obligation.49 Judge Bhandari argued that the requirement to submit special permits for 
review and comment by the Scientific Committee obliged Japan to engage in a “proper 
dialogue with the Committee concerning the scientific output of JARPA with the aim of 
possibly revising JARPA II prior to its launch.”50 Judge Bhandari’s views are echoed by 
Judge ad hoc Charlesworth who indicated that there is an affirmative obligation “on the 
proposing State to co-operate with the Committee” which means providing the IWC with 
permits before issuance so that the Scientific Committee can review and comment on them, 
providing “specified information” about the permits, engaging the participation of the 
international scientific community in the research, and giving “consideration in good faith to 
the views of the IWC and the Scientific Committee.”51 While the findings of the Committee 
do not need to be accepted by the State requesting scientific permit review, the State “must 
show genuine willingness to reconsider its position in light of [the Committee’s] views.”52 
Particularly troubling for several of the judges was the lack of assessment of JARPA before 
Japan issued permits under JARPA II that were “virtual replicas” of the JARPA permits.53 
The judges expressed concern that the review process before the Committee which they 
                                           
48 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n.1) at para. 19, p. 5; Whaling in the 
Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade (n.1) at para. 17, p. 6.; Whaling in the Antarctic, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n.1) at para. 10, p. 3.; Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Ad Hoc Charlesworth (n.1) at para. 5, pp. 1-2. 
49 See e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n.1) at para. 15, pp. 3-4. 
50 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n.1) at para. 10, p. 3. 
51 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Charlesworth (n.1) at paras. 14-15, pp. 4-5. 
52 Ibid., at paras. 15, pp. 4-5. 
53 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n.1), at para. 17, p. 4; Whaling in the 
Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n.1), at para. 18, p. 5. 
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understood as being integral to the operation of the ICRW was being treated as an 
“unacceptable ‘rubber stamp’ mechanism” in violation of a duty to co-operate that is “a broad 
and purposive obligation that entails an on-going dialogue with the Scientific Committee.”54 
The question after Whaling in the Antarctic is whether the Committee will be able to 
contribute meaningfully to discussions regarding the future of whales and whaling or whether 
the efforts of the Committee to promote scientific methodology will be hijacked by national 
politics. 
 
Renegotiating Faultlines: Proposals for Annex VIII Reform  
At the IWC’s meeting in September 2014 after the ICJ decision, Parties adopted a resolution 
on whaling under special permit which included the request that States not issue further 
permits until (1) the Scientific Committee had an opportunity to provide advice on 
“reasonableness” and (2) the Commission could review an Scientific Committee report to 
make such recommendations “as it sees fit.”55 The resolution identified the ICJ opinion and 
noted that the opinion presented an authoritative interpretation of Article VIII. Specifically, 
the resolution recalled that the “Court established several parameters for a programme for 
purposes of scientific research” that the IWC should consider when reviewing special 
permits.56 The IWC made note of certain elements that it might review including “the scale 
of the programme’s use of lethal sampling, the methodology used to select sample sizes, a 
comparison of the target sample sizes and the actual take, the timeframe associated with a 
programme, the programme’s scientific output, and the degree to which a programme 
coordinates its activities with related research projects.”57 Significantly, the vote on the 
resolution was not a consensus vote but ended with 35 parties in favor, 25 against, and 5 
abstentions.58 The vote on the resolution reflected the differences between whaling industry 
                                           
54 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade (n.1) at para. 19, p. 6; Whaling in the 
Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n.1) at para. 9, pp. 2-3 and at para. 11, p. 3. 
55 IWC, ‘Resolutions Adopted at the 65th Meeting: Resolution 2014-5, Resolution on Whaling under Special 
Permits, Sec. 3. Available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection72&k=; accessed 1 
June 2015. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 IWC, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting (2014), p. 17, para. 151. Available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=!collection49&bc_from=themes; accessed 1 June 2015 
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revival States and preservation states. 
In light of both the ICJ’s decision and the Resolution, it is clear that a subset of ICRW 
members expect both more objective engagement by the Scientific Committee as it reviews 
scientific permits and programs and more “meaningful” on-going cooperation between States 
and the Scientific Committee. Existing ICRW documents contemplate an active Scientific 
Committee. For example, the IWC Rules of Procedure provide that “The Scientific 
Committee shall review the current scientific and statistical information with respect to 
whales and whaling, shall review current scientific research programmes of Governments, 
other international organisations or of private organisations, shall review the scientific 
permits and scientific programmes for which Contracting Governments plan to issue 
scientific permits, shall review current and potential threats and methods to mitigate them in 
order to maintain cetacean populations at viable levels, shall provide conservation and 
management advice where appropriate, shall consider such additional matters as may be 
referred to it by the Commission or by the Chair of the Commission, and shall submit reports 
and recommendations to the Commission.”59 This is an active and full agenda for a body that 
is underfunded and relies on voluntary scientific advice from either national delegates who 
are funded by their State or invited participants who may or may not receive funding from a 
State or from the IWC.60 
Existing ICRW documents contemplate a deeper level of cooperation with the Scientific 
Committee from those States seeking to take whales for purposes of scientific research. The 
IWC’s Rules of the Procedures provide that countries intending to operate research programs 
requiring permitting under Article VIII should provide to the Scientific Committee “specifics 
as to the objectives of the research, number, sex, size, and stock of the animals to be taken, 
opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other nations, and the possible 
effect on conservation of the stock resulting from granting the permits.”61 The Committee 
                                           
59 IWC, Rules of Procedure of the International Whaling Commission 2014, Section M.4(a), p. 7. Available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=; accessed 18 March 2015. 
60 IWC, Scientific Committee Handbook. Available at https://iwc.int/scientific-committee-handbook; accessed 
18 March 2015 (Noting that “funding for invited participants will be provided if available” (emphasis in 
original); Noting further that the research budget approved by the Commission to support the efforts of the 
Scientific Committee for 2012-2013 was £314,984). 
61 IWC, Rules of Procedure of the Scientific Committee, Section F, p. 24. Available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=; accessed 18 March 2015. 
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should review and comment on this data in light of existing biological and ecological 
knowledge. 
But can the Scientific Committee as an institution satisfy the competing interests of sufficient 
member States to be considered an effective treaty institution? In practice, the Scientific 
Committee reports since the inception of JARPA II have reflected repeated problems in 
reviewing ICRW Article VIII permit proposals.62 In 2005, for example, during the review 
process of JARPA II permits, the Committee commented that “the Committee recognises the 
chronic difficulties it faces in separating purely scientific issues from those issues that are 
more appropriate for discussion in other fora and notably the Commission.”63 In 2006, the 
Committee noted that “it has difficulties in reviewing scientific permit proposals” because it 
was not possible for “a large Working Group of the Committee …to efficiently review 
complex documents such as the recent special permit proposals.”64 In 2007, the Committee 
commented again that “the process for reviewing the special permits is less than 
satisfactory.”65 The Committee opined that scientists who were participating in special 
permit review from a Government who was requesting review of a special permit should not 
participate in the drafting of the “findings and recommendations” which should “only reflect 
the opinions of the independent experts.”66 
Institutional problems were flagged again in 2010 when the Scientific Committee observed 
that an expert panel responsible for reviewing proposed scientific research permits to be 
issued under JARPA II may have had conflicts of interest. According to the report, five 
members, representing about half of the members of the expert panel, had either published 
using data obtained under JARPA or were a scientist directly associated with the program.67 
                                           
62 For purposes of this article, each Summary Report of the Scientific Committee from the start of JARPA II in 
2005 to its conclusion in 2014 was reviewed for observations about the review of proposed special permits to be 
issued under Article VIII. 
63 IWC, ‘2005 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2006) 8 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean Research and 
Management 1-65, at p. 52 (Sec. 16.2. Review of new or continuing proposals, 16.2.1. JARPA II). 
64 IWC, ‘2006 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2007) 9 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean Research and 
Management 1-73, at pp. 57-58 (Sec. 16.1. Improving the Committee’s procedure for reviewing scientific permit 
proposals).  
65 IWC, ‘2007 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2008) 10 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean Research and 
Management 1-74, at p. 60 (Sec. 17.4. Improving the Committee’s procedures for reviewing scientific permit 
proposals and research results). 
66 Id., at pp. 60-61. 
67 IWC, ‘2009 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2010) 11 (SUPPL. 2) Journal of Cetacean Research and 
Management 1-98, at pp. 78-79 (Sec. 17.6. Evaluate the performance of the agreed procedure for reviewing 
 
 17  
Four of the ten members apparently had played important roles in earlier reviews of special 
permits for Japan.68 Members of the Scientific Committee were split about the need for 
members of an expert panel to submit conflict of interest statements before reviewing 
proposals to issue scientific permits.69 Adding to the challenges of creating an independent 
panel, the 2010 Scientific Committee report also suggested that Parties such as Japan seeking 
review of special permits are not providing review panels with sufficient information before 
the requested review.70 
In 2012 and 2013, it was unclear whether any special permits that Japan intended to issue 
under JARPA II were ever reviewed by the Scientific Committee. In 2013, the only note in 
the Scientific Committee report under review of new “proposals” indicated that “Japan 
reported that there was no plan to change the JARPA II programme.”71 While reviews of any 
special permits for these seasons may appear in subsidiary documentation, it is surprising that 
there is no mention of permits given that the Scientific Committee is expected to review 
proposals for scientific permits before they are issued by a ICRW party and permits were 
presumably issued for the 2013-2014 whaling season. 
In 2014, Japan prepared a new proposal for Antarctic whaling to be vetted under a process 
that included review “by a small specialist workshop with a limited but adequate number of 
invited experts” followed by a submission of a report to the Scientific Committee as a 
whole.72 According to the 2014 Scientific Committee report, the Government of Japan would 
underwrite the costs of the specialist workshop to be held in Tokyo, Japan. These comments 
by the Scientific Committee regarding this Japan-based review process were not endorsed by 
“scientists from countries that made a statement at plenary that it was inappropriate for the 
SC (scientific committee) to continue the review of the JARPA II programme” and therefore 
“did not participate in the discussion related to JARPA II agenda items.”73 
                                                                                                                                   
scientific permit proposals, and periodic and final review of results from scientific permit research) 
68 Ibid., at p. 79. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 IWC, ‘2013 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2014) 15 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean Research and 
Management 1-75, at p. 61 (Sec. 17.5. Review of new or continuing proposals, 17.5.1. JARPA II). 
72 IWC, ‘2014 Report of the Scientific Committee’, IWC/65/Rep01(2014), 09/06/2014, at p. 74 (Sec. 17.4.2. 
Planning for review of future Japanese Special Permit research in Antarctic). 
73 Ibid., at p. 68 (Sec. 17.1. Expert Panel Review of the results from JARPA II). 
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The new Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the 
Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) is a relatively short proposal of 42 pages accompanied by 13 
annexes.74 In NEWREP-A, the Japanese government took the opportunity to highlight the 
portions of the ICJ decision that it deemed significant including the conclusion that (1) 
whales taken under Article VIII are not subject to the IWC Schedule; (2) the object and 
purpose of the treaty includes “sustainable exploitation”; (3) the Guidelines for research 
include not just research on whales but also research on “hypotheses not directly related to 
the management of living marine resources”; (4) the State authorizing special permits has an 
obligation to offer an “objective basis” for the lethal takes; and (5) lethal sampling “per se” 
was “not unreasonable in relation to the research objectives of JARPA II.” The NEWREP-A 
document set out to address the specific inadequacies of the JARPA II program identified by 
the ICJ with a particular focus on providing a justification for lethal methods and evidence 
for the size of the lethal sampling set.75 On the issue of lethal takes, Japan investigated the 
feasibility of using other methods besides lethal methods including biopsy sampling, satellite 
tagging, data-logger use, and biomarkers.76 Japan concludes that these alternatives are not 
feasible for measuring “age at sexual maturity” which Japan asserts is necessary for setting a 
maximum sustainable yield ratio and for measuring prey consumption; therefore lethal take 
methods are necessitated in order to obtain earplugs and dissect of internal organs.77 
Regarding lethal sample sizes, Japan indicates in its proposed research plan that the numbers 
it has picked are largely based on collective “age at sexual maturity” data but that these sizes 
may need to be revised.78  
To address squarely the issue that Japan de facto is participating in commercial whaling 
through its distribution of special permits under the research proposal, Japan notes that 
“Japan has therefore announced that it confirmed its basic policy of pursuing the resumption 
of commercial whaling, and collecting and analyzing necessary data through special permit 
                                           
74 Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean, available at 
maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/newrep--a.pdf, accessed 10 September 2015. 
75 Ibid., at pp. 6-7. The Japanese government also identified other issues raised by the ICJ decision including 
methodology for selecting whales that would be taken, the open-ended time frame of the scientific programme, 
the limited scientific output of the programme to date, and the lack of cooperation with other whale research 
efforts.   
76 Ibid., at p. 8. 
77 Ibid., at p. 9. 
78 Ibid. 
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whaling for this purpose, in full accordance with legal requirements including the ICRW, its 
paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule which establishes the moratorium on commercial whaling, 
as well as in light of the ICJ Judgment.”79 Japan is unequivocal that results from NEWREP-
A’s are intended to end the twenty-year moratorium.80 With Japan’s intention to issue special 
permits as an initial step towards resuming whaling, Japan identifies NEWREP-A as offering 
“an objective basis” for justifying lethal research under Article VIII.81 In keeping with its 
conciliatory stance on following institutional process, the document further indicated that 
Japan is amenable to feedback from other States and institutions about the proposal.82 Japan 
specifically indicated that “After the IWC SC will ‘review and comment’ on this proposed 
plan, those comments will be given due regard and the proposed plan will be revised, if 
necessary, taking account of them.”83 
What happened next reveals the increasing fragility of the IWC as an institution capable of 
handling both the conservation of whales and the sustainable use of whales as commercial 
resources. In April 2015, Japan submitted NEWREP-A for the review of a ten person expert 
panel. Some members of the IWC’s expert panel questioned to what degree the NEWREP-A 
differed in its objectives from JARPA/JARPA II and requested additional data be supplied to 
determine whether lethal sampling was necessary for whale stock management and 
conservation.84 The panel further recommended that a series of panel recommendation many 
of which included collecting additional information over the course of 1-3 field seasons 
“should be completed and the results evaluated before there is a final conclusion on lethal 
techniques and sample sizes.”85 Additional questions were raised by scientists observing the 
expert panel.86 There were dissenting voices among scientists observing the panel.87 Japan 
                                           
79 Ibid., at p. 11. 
80 The moratorium was adopted in 1982 but applied to the 1985/1986 season.  
81 NEWREP-A (n. 74), at p. 7. 
82 Ibid. (“Japan always welcomes comments from outside that are based upon scientific consideration to which 
it will give due regard.”) 
83 Ibid., at 11.  
84 Report of the expert panel to review the proposal by Japan for NEWREP-A, 7-10 February, 2015, Tokyo, 
Japan, SC/66a/Rep6 (2015): 2 (“In summary, with the information presented in the proposal, the Panel noted 
that it was not able to determine whether lethal sampling is necessary to achieve the two major objectives; 
therefore, it concluded that the current proposal did not demonstrate the need for lethal sampling to achieve 
those objectives.”) 
85 Ibid. 
86 P. Wade, Brief Review of Whether Lethal Methods are Required for NEWREP-A, SC/F15/SP06 (2015); P. 
Wade, What is the Best Way to Age Antarctic Minke Whales?, SC/F13/SP05 (2015). 
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submitted some additional data.88 
But in June 2015, the IWC Scientific Committee indicated based on the Expert Panel report 
that it still did not have adequate information to determine whether lethal sampling was 
necessary.89 They requested Japan to reply to the Panel’s recommendations and progress 
would be reviewed in 2016.90 The Scientific Committee did endorse the deployment by 
Japan of vessels for biopsy sampling and satellite tagging of whales.91 The report and the 
scientific committee meeting itself continued to reflect the fissure lines within the IWC that 
seem to be becoming increasingly more entrenched.92    
As of September 2015, Japan and its pro-utilization allies are in a stand off with pro-
preservation States. Japan has stated that it may unilaterally resume whaling under 
NEWREP-A in spite of the lack of consensus from the Committee that the NEWREP-A 
program offers a reasonable scientific research design.93 This is perhaps not surprising given 
pressure from certain domestic constituencies. In spite of Japan’s acknowledgment of the 
binding nature of the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling, Japan’s media has been given 
undue emphasis to the stockpiling of whale meat in Japan for what seem to be commercial 
                                                                                                                                   
87 See e.g. T. Gunnlaugsson and G.A. Víkingsson, Comments on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific 
Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) submitted to the Scientific Committee of the 
IWC by The Government of Japan, SC/F15/SP04 (2015) (Finding that “the new research program, together with 
the data collected during JARPA and JARPAII, will constitute a unique data series on the Antarctic ecosystem 
that will have a great value for the future, e.g. for studies on climate change); L. Pastene et al., A Response to 
“SC/F15/SP03”, SC/F15/SP11 (2015); T. Kitakado, A Response to “SC/F15/SP02”, SC-F15-SP09 (2015); T. 
Tamura and K. Konishi, A Response to Document SC/F15/SP01 ‘Comments on proposed research plan for new 
scientific whale research program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) with regard to feeding ecology 
objectives’ by R. Leaper and B.A. Roel, SC-F15-SP08 (2015) 
88 Government of Japan, Addendum to the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research 
Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A), SC/66a/SP2 (2015).  
89 IWC, ‘2015 Report of the Scientific Committee’, IWC/66/Rep01(2015) (June 9, 2015): 96. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., at p. 52.  
92 Ibid., at 93. “After initial general discussion of this item, a number of comments both supporting NEWREP-
A and opposing it were made, some addressing particular issues and others offering broad comments on the 
general merits or otherwise of the lethal aspects of the proposal, ecosystem management, interpretations of the 
Resolution from a procedural perspective, a letter19 from a group of 500 scientists from 30 countries opposing 
the proposal and various comments on the judgment of the International Court of Justice. From this discussion, 
it was clear that it would not be possible to develop a consensus Committee view of NEWREP-A.” 
93 Whale Hunt to be Resumed this Year, The Japan Times (June 23, 2015) (Citing Joji Morishita, Japan’s 
representative to the IWC, who claims that pro-preservation states are engaging in “environmental imperialism” 
and regretting that “There is no definite conclusion in the report itself . . . which is not so surprising in the IWC, 
because as we know very well the IWC is a divided organization.”) 
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ventures.94 
In spite of some changes with the introduction of new review procedures that the Committee 
is trying to implement,95 the status quo does not appear to have shifted much from how 
scientific whaling permits have been previously reviewed under JARPA II.96 The only 
existing obligation associated with Article VIII is for a Contracting Government to provide 
the IWC with “proposed scientific permits before they are issued in sufficient time to allow 
the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them.”97 There is nothing specific in 
either Article VIII or in the Schedule to prevent a State from ultimately issuing a special 
permit that the Scientific Committee may have reservations over as long as the Committee 
has been given adequate opportunity to “review and comment”. This gap between procedure 
and substance has proven problematic in the review of NEWREP-A. Japan seems to be 
taking the position that the Scientific Committee has had its opportunity to review and 
comment on the permit and that there is no obligation for Japan to submit any additional data 
since as the IWC’s webpage states “the IWC does not regulate special permit whaling.”98  
Japan appears in June 2015 to have conceded to provide additional data but not because it is 
obliged to do so.99 But should submitting proposals for scientific whaling such as NEWREP-
A to the IWC institutions simply be a matter of diplomatic courtesy or can the IWC 
institutions help to create a more rationale framework for exercising sovereign rights over 
natural resources?  
The same institutional problems highlighted in the 2005-2014 scientific committee reports 
that raise questions about the ICRW’s legitimacy are likely to continue to reoccur in the 
future. If there is a general consensus with the exception of a few persistent objectors that 
substantive independent scientific review should be the foundation for the approval of these 
                                           
94 Japan’s Whaling Hiatus Sees Meat Stocks Hit 15-year Low, The Japan Times (July 19, 2015) (Indicating that 
“inventories at whale meat distributors with large-scale refrigeration or freezer facilities stood at 3,027 tons at 
the end of August and have since continued falling”, that “Japan plans to import about 1,800 tons of whale meat 
from Iceland via the Arctic Sea to cope with the declining inventories”, and that there will be “tough conditions 
in the near-term for wholesalers of whale meat and restaurants serving it.”) 
95 IWC, ‘2015 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (n. 88). 
96 IWC, ‘2014 Report of the Scientific Committee, Annex P: Process for the Review of Special Permit 
Proposals and Research Results from Existing and Completed Permits’, IWC/65/Rep01(2014): Annex P, 
09/06/2014. 
97 ICRW (n. 2) at Schedule, Article 30. 
98 IWC, Special Permit Whaling, https://iwc.int/permits; accessed 15 September 2015.  
99 Whale Hunt to be Resumed this Year, The Japan Times (n. 92). 
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permits as several of the committee reports have suggested, then it may be time to amend 
both Article VIII and the IWC Schedule Paragraph 30 to empower the Scientific Committee 
to issue Article VIII permits on a season by season basis to any State sponsored scientific 
research entity that requests a permit. 
Even though it may take time to achieve this substantial revision to both the treaty and its 
schedule due to political concerns over ceding sovereign interests to international institutions, 
these amendments are politically possible. When the ICRW was concluded in 1949, no one 
would have predicted a multi-year moratorium on commercial whaling imposed under the 
ICRW. Today, the ICRW has 88 Member States.100 A decision by the Commission to amend 
the treaty only requires a simple majority; a decision to change the schedule would require a 
three-quarters majority vote.101 As previously noted, the vote on the 2014 Resolution on 
whaling under special permits was a split vote with 35 favorable votes, 25 opposed votes, and 
5 abstentions.102 While it is unclear how 23 other states who did not participate in the vote 
would have voted on this matter, the existing voting ratio from the 2014 Resolution would be 
sufficient for a Commission decision to pursue an amendment to the treaty. Based on the 
discussion involving the 2014 Resolution, at least one block of States, the Buenos Aires 
Group, might even become the champions for an amendment process for the treaty.103 
Understandably, a decision to amend the treaty alone may not be a game changer for States 
such as Japan because Japan would be entitled to reject any amendments to the multilateral 
treaty and instead continue to comply with the original unamended treaty language.104 This is 
a fair critique and a realistic potential outcome. Proceeding to amend the treaty, however, 
would accurately reflect the existing intent of the majority of ICRW Parties to manage whale 
resources on the basis of data obtained from scientific research that has been vetted with the 
support of an international scientific community. The existence of an amended treaty ratified 
by States who support reform of Article VIII could serve as a strategic tool for some States to 
persuade other States of the merits of rebuilding a long-term commercial whaling industry 
                                           
100 IWC, https://iwc.int/home; accessed 1 August 2015. 
101 ICRW (n. 2) at Article III(2). 
102 IWC 2014-5 Resolution (n.55). 
103 Ibid., at p. 16, para. 146 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru 
and Uruguay opposed scientific whaling and recommended amendments to the treaty so that “special permits 
cannot be issued unilaterally.”)  
104 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force 1980), Part IV. 
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based on shared data that is deemed to be highly reliable data. 
These amendment proposals are practical from an institutional perspective and should be 
regarded by States as achieving “good faith” implementation of the object and purpose of the 
ICRW that was negotiated “to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum 
utilization of the whale resources.”105 The purpose of the scientific research permit available 
under Article VIII is to allow ICRW Parties to collectively consider information about whale 
stocks so that the Parties will collectively make rational management decisions regarding 
future harvest allowances for different species in different locations. This is why individual 
States have an affirmative obligation to “transmit to such body as may be designated by the 
Commission, in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one year, scientific 
information available to that Government with respect to whales and whaling.”106 
Judge Sebutinde aptly points out in her separate opinion that because “the scientific research 
to be conducted under such [Article VIII] permits is intended for the benefit of not only the 
State issuing the permits but also the International Whaling Commission and the international 
whaling community as a whole…[t]he discretion afforded by Article VIII…is necessarily 
limited in scope and character.”107 What this suggests is that permits for scientific research 
presently issued by individual States under Article VIII must function to generate credible, 
high-quality data that can become the basis for collectively defining international commercial 
harvest limits. Whether data will be ultimately deemed credible and high-quality by the IWC 
and the international whaling community depends in part on the underlying substantive 
design of any given research framework. The credibility of the design of a research 
framework is a decision best left to whale researchers and not politicians.  
Article VIII(1) permits are exceptional permits to improve collective knowledge about whale 
resources in order to make institutionally educated decisions about management. These 
permits are not issued as part of the system for regulating commercial whaling where States 
have a direct interest in exercising jurisdictional control over their nationals. Because the 
information collected from scientific research permits is intended to be shared with the 
                                           
105 ICRW, (n. 2) Article V(2). 
106 Ibid., Article VIII(3). 
107 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde, (n.1) at para. 4, p. 1. 
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Commission or a body designated by the Commission, it would be beneficial for the 
Scientific Committee, the entity most likely to be working with the data to propose catch 
limits, to take a more active role in the issuance of the final research permits. A proposal to 
amend the administration of Article VIII permits by giving permitting authority to the 
Scientific Committee attempts to both honor the object and purpose of the original treaty 
while simultaneously reflecting existing concerns of a number of ICRW Parties that Article 
VIII permits have not always been fully vetted by independent experts for scientific rigor.   
While the existing language in Article VIII is highly deferential to the power of individual 
States to issue permits “subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other 
conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit”, this deferential position does not reflect 
the viewpoints of at least 35 members of the IWC who have voted more recently for a greater 
degree of involvement of the Scientific Committee and the Commission in the special permit 
process.108 While there is no precedent for permits issued by an international body to an 
individual state as part of a global administrative state, the whaling regime is an appropriate 
framework for experimenting with such practices given the negotiated and widely supported 
moratorium impacting a highly migratory species.109 One question is whether the existing 
treaty mechanism of authorizing individual States to unilaterally issue scientific permits 
should be considered increasingly obsolete in lights of socio-political changes driven by the 
expansion of globalized communications and fishing fleets. 
A number of global conditions have changed since 1946 when States agreed to allow 
individual States to issue and revoke scientific permits for “any of its nationals” that might 
favor a new approach beyond the current status quo based on States issuing special permits 
with limited review and comment from the Scientific Committee. While after World War II, it 
may have made sense for each State to issues its own scientific permits because of the 
physical difficulty of coordinating information through post or wire between an 
intergovernmental organization like the IWC based in England and a State member such as 
                                           
108 IWC 2014-5 Resolution (n. 55). 
109 This type of international permitting supported by scientific verification may also be appropriate for other 
species. See generally, A. Telesetsky, ‘Going Once, Going Twice--Sold to the Highest Bidder: Restoring Equity 
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Japan, in 2015, these barrier no longer exist. Decisions on permits can be rapidly 
disseminated. Reporting can be done easily through electronic means. 
In addition, the current approach under Article VIII that favors the nation-state is ripe for 
potential abuse that would not have been as great of a concern in 1946. The language in 
Article VIII allows for permits to be issued to “any of its nationals.” Ships have the 
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly and are therefore nationals of their 
flag state.110 Under Article VIII, a permit could be issued to any research vessel that is 
entitled to fly the flag of the State issuing the permit or to a corporate entity claiming to do 
“research and development”. Since World War II, “flags of convenience” (FOC) from open 
registries have become prevalent and these FOC States may unilaterally issue research 
permits to “nationals” as long as they otherwise comply with the ICRW Schedule. Requesting 
permits from a FOC State might be strategically pursued by private entities who wish to 
commercially whale but are located primarily in a State supporting the existing commercial 
whaling moratorium. FOC States in the context of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 
(IUU fishing) have notoriously poor enforcement records. It is worth noting that a number of 
the more recent parties to the ICRW who joined after the moratorium include States that are 
associated with offering “flags of convenience” including Belize, Cambodia, Panama, and 
Mongolia who have been implicated in IUU fishing.111 These States could authorize research 
permits that would feed a market for whale meat particularly in States with increasingly 
limited access to protein resources.   
If States are willing to support amendments to Article VIII, the Scientific Committee could be 
authorized to administer a process for the issuance of scientific permits. This process would 
be available for any scientific entities requesting permits to take whales. There is no rational 
reason that a scientific entity engaged in whaling research must be sponsored by a single 
State as the current system provides. If the Scientific Committee through a panel of 
independent experts is empowered to issue permits rather than individual States, this 
                                           
110 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS 396, Article 91. 
111 IWC, ‘Membership and Contracting Governments’. Available at https://iwc.int/members; accessed 18 
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administrative process might improve the transparency and accountability currently 
associated with whaling research permits. This shift in the issuance of permits from national 
offices to international organizations may avoid the recurring diplomatic disputes that States 
such as Japan are engaging in commercial whaling under the guise of a scientific permit.112 
In order to prevent politics from undermining decision-making on the basis of scientific 
findings by the Scientific Committee, States may also agree to articulate in any amendment a 
legal standard whereby a scientific permit issued by the Committee will be deemed to be 
valid unless the Commission can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Scientific 
Committee is exercising its authority arbitrarily and capriciously.  
While this proposed reform may depoliticize some aspects of Article VIII permits and 
provide a better framework for determining whether a given scientific program has been 
reasonably designed and implemented as mandated by the ICJ, it will not be enough to 
simply reform the practices associated with the issuance of special permits to close the 
existing faultlines between pro-whaling industry and pro-preservation States. As distasteful as 
it may be for pro-preservation States, the ICRW is a treaty “for the conservation, 
development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources.” While there may be different 
ideas about what constitutes “optimum utilization of the whale resources” particularly in light 
of ecosystem service discussions over protecting complex marine food chains and top 
predators, the ICRW was negotiated in 1946 to support the “orderly development of the 
whaling industry.” Because it is not a preservation treaty per se but reflects instead an early 
effort at sustainable development, the IWC must revisit the stalled Revised Management 
Schemes to determine how some level of commercial whaling might be resumed that would 
also address national food security concerns.113 If it is simply a question of when the 
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moratorium will be lifted rather than whether the moratorium will be lifted, then pro-
preservation States may need to endorse an approach that does not rely on a zero sum strategy 
but perhaps focuses instead on protecting certain key breeding or feeding areas.114 
Whaling in the Antarctic puts in sharp relief the conflicts between State parties over the 
current operation and the future capacity of the ICRW treaty regime to address whales and 
whaling. While States may not be able to quickly reconcile their divergent interests, 
something will need to change institutionally at the Commission for the ICRW to be an 
effective conservation and sustainable development treaty for the 21st century. A key focus for 
States should be on empowering the Committee to substantively inform decision-making to 
support the objectives of the ICRW. Otherwise, States can find better uses for their limited 
resources than propping up a broken treaty regime that neither contributes to long-term 
conservation of whales nor potential food security. 
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